The basis of the product liability claims in Salerno are centered around an injury the plaintiff sustained while working in a surveillance cargo van manufactured by the defendant. The van contained a video periscope system. The plaintiff's injury occurred when he tried to stand inside the cargo van and struck his head on the metal periscope. According to the plaintiff's product liability complaint, his severe head trauma and resulting seizures could have been avoided if the defendant's product had not been unreasonably dangerous and defective.

The trial court granted the defendant manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the risk of being harmed by the periscope was open and obvious and that the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff from any resulting injuries.

Upon review, the Appellate Court was critical of the trial court's reason for dismissing the Illinois product defect lawsuit. In a prior decision the Illinois Supreme Court decided that a product's open and obvious risk of harm does not constitute an absolute defense in a strict liability count. While this defense may be considered as part of the risk-utility analysis it can not constitute the only factor.

The injured Illinois resident suffered shoulder, hip, and leg injuries as a result of the Illinois train derailment. The plaintiff required multiple surgeries for his fractured him and underwent a lengthy physical therapy program. There were several additional passengers who were injured on that date and two women died; however, the $2 million settlement is for Kevin Hurley's injuries only. The families of the two women who died as a result of the derailment have previously settled their Illinois wrongful death claims for $11 million. Presumably the other parties have also filed their own claims against Metra.

According to the National Transportation Safety Board's railroad accident brief, the September 17, 2005 Metra derailment was the result of the engineer's failure to obey signals warning him to reduce his speed and failure to obey the speed restrictions at the train crossover. At the time of the accident the Rock Island Metra train was going 69 mph through a track crossover area; the maximum allowable speed is 10 mph. As a result of the high speeds and the severe angle of the track caused the wheels to jump the track and derail.

Pippen's complaint alleged that at the time he was purchasing the private jet he was under the impression that he was investing $1 million for a quarter-share of the plane and would only need to pay for expenses related to its use and upkeep. However, in reality the basketball player was purchasing 51 percent of the plane, taking out a loan of $5 million to do so.

When signing the documents Pippen stated that he believed that his lawyers at Pedersen & Houpt had approved the deal and was unaware that the conditions of the purchase had changed and that he was taking out a loan. According to the allegations Pippen lost $8 million as a result of the purchase.

The trial court upheld the defendant's right to arbitrate and denied plaintiff's request for a jury trial. This arbitration clause issue was recently ruled on by the Illinois Supreme Court in Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, No. 106511 (4/15/10), where the Court upheld the nursing home's right to arbitrate in Illinois nursing home abuse cases.

The main issue in both Peterson and Carter revolves around the signed arbitration agreement. However, while in Carter the arbitration language was included in the nursing home care contract, in Peterson the arbitration agreement was a separate document. It seems that this seemingly small difference has in fact resulted in a very different legal outcome in Peterson.

The Appellate Court held that even though the two documents were signed on the same date that there was no evidence that they should be taken as one unified document. The language used in the arbitration agreement was very vague and never specifically referred to the nursing home care contract, nor did the nursing home care contract ever refer to the arbitration agreement. Specifically, the arbitration agreement stated, "Notwithstanding the parties intent to submit any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or any other document signed or initialed in connection with this agreement to arbitration."

While the court noted that prior case law has supported the connection between two separate documents signed at the same time, the law requires that "an enforceable contract must be premised on language that is definite and certain as to all essential terms." Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 144 Ill. 2d1224, 30 (1991). The court found that the language included in the arbitration agreement did not satisfy this requirement.

Sergeant Wright comes from a military family and had dreamed of becoming a Marine ever since his childhood. He graduated from Boot Camp and Camp Pendleton's School of Infantry (SOI) and was deployed to Iraq in February 2004 as part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom II campaign.

Within two months of his deployment Sergeant Wright's company came under heavy fire, leaving Wright severely wounded. His bravery and composure on that day earned him the Bronze Star. Wright spent a year recovering and rehabbing at Walter Reed Army Medical Center before returning to complete two years of active duty. Wright instructed his fellow Marines in hand-to-hand combat as part of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Commitment of Excellence (MACE).

The events leading to the case began in 2005 when Perez's boyfriend, Baeza, was driving them home from a quinceañera, i.e. a coming of age celebration for a 15 year-old girl. Baeza had been drinking and was speeding along when his car left the roadway and struck a tree. He was later charged with an aggravated DUI.

At the time of the Illinois car crash Perez was a passenger in the front seat. Baeza had modified the front seats of his car, replacing the factory-installed seats with race car seats distributed by the California-based Sparco Motor Sports, Inc. Perez was left a quadriplegic as a result of the auto accident.

The majority of the corporation's directors and officers alleged that they should be dismissed from the case because they had no knowledge of the fraud committed by Krupa, an officer of the corporation. The main issue in the plaintiffs' complaint was that Krupa had conned plaintiffs into giving him their money for a special "investment fund" he alleged was limited to the corporation's officers and directors. The issue before the Appellate Court was whether the remaining officers and directors are liable for Krupa's actions.

The Appellate Court referred to Murphy v. Walters, 87 Ill.App.3d 415 (1980) when considering the remaining officers and directors' liability.

As a general rule, a corporation’s officer or director is not liable for the fraud of other officers or agents merely because of its official character, but he is individually liable for fraudulent acts of his own or in which he participates. . . He is liable only if he with knowledge, or recklessly without it, participates or assists in the fraud.

While typically an Appellate Court will not overturn a jury's monetary awards since this is "an issue of fact for the jury to determine". Typically a jury's verdict awards will only be overturned if a party shows that the jury obviously ignored an established element of damages, that the award does not relate to the loss suffered, or if the verdict was the result of prejudice.

The facts of the case were that the plaintiff was rear-ended by the defendant. She did not seek treatment for the car crash until the day after the accident, at which time she was complaining of headaches and neck pain. The plaintiff went on to receive several rounds of physical therapy, but with little relief. She eventually underwent surgery to repair a tear in her shoulder.

While working at one of ConAgra's warehouses a forklift hit the plaintiff from behind. The force of the impact knocked the plaintiff to the ground, where the forklift ran over his right leg. The forklift in question was one of four machines that ConAgra had rented for use at its St. Charles, Illinois warehouse.

In order to make a viable Illinois product defect case against the forklift manufacturer the plaintiff needed to know which of the four forklifts had hit him. Without being sure which forklift was involved in the accident it would be difficult for the plaintiff to claim that the accident was caused by the forklift's malfunction as a result of a product defect.

However, while ConAgra did make an investigation into the accident it never document which forklift was responsible. Furthermore, ConAgra had already returned at least on of the forklifts to the leasing company by the time the plaintiff began to investigate the workplace accident on his own. Therefore, the plaintiff was never able to discover which forklift ran him over and consequently was unable to prove his product defect case against the forklift manufacturer.

The plaintiff sought restitution from his employer on spoliation of evidence claims. In response, the defendant ConAgra filed a motion for summary judgment stating that given the relevant facts that it owed no duty the plaintiff on the spoliation issue.

According to reports, these cribs' product defect seems to result from a product design defect that allows the baby to slip into the gap that opens up when the movable sides separate from the crib. There have been reports of over 30 babies in the U.S. alone who have died as a result of the malfunctioning cribs and over 250 consumer reports of defective sides during the span of 2000 to 2009. The inherent dangers in these types of cribs has prompted a spokesperson from Kids in Danger, a Chicago-based advocacy group, to warn parents not to use a drop-sided crib.

A 2007 expose by the Chicago Tribune can be credited with first exposing the dangers that can result from the crib's product defect. To date there have been approximately 9 million cribs recalled. For more information on the specific cribs included in the recall, visit the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission's website.

Vincent was brought on behalf of decedent Marjorie Vincent, alleging that defendant nursing home Alden-Park Strathmoor, Inc. caused personal injuries to decedent prior to her death while in defendant's care. Under Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint, the estate sought to reserve the right to seek punitive damages under a survival action in the Nursing Home Care Act for willful and wanton behavior.

Punitive damages are additional damages that can be awarded as a way to punish a defendant for willful and wanton behavior, among other things. Counts I, II and III of plaintiff's complaint dealt with compensatory damages, which would reimburse the estate for actual loss or harm as a result of defendant's actions.

The defendant nursing home won a motion to strike plaintiff's punitive damages reservation from the complaint on the basis that punitive damages claims do not survive a resident's death. In response the plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal seeking to reinstate its right to claim punitive damages under a survivor action. However, the Appellate Court agreed with the lower court and held that punitive damages cannot be claimed under a survival action under the Nursing Home Care Act.

In Illinois, the amount of damages awarded is typically left up to the jury's discretion. The jury is given judge-approved jury instructions so that the jury can make an informed decision regarding its verdict. Oftentimes if a party disagrees with the verdict their appeal focuses on the content of these jury instructions. For example, in Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., No. 108910, the Appellate Court considered issues regarding the sole proximate cause jury instruction.

However, in Kiggins, the issue was not the jury instructions, but the jury's decision itself. Kiggins argued that he should have been awarded damages for pain and suffering and disfigurement. The basis for this argument was that he had suffered more than a minor injury as a result of the auto accident and as such was entitled to additional non-economic damages.

The plaintiff's ex-husband had worked at B&O Railroad as a steelworker, welder, railroad firefighter and laborer from 1951 to 1965. During the majority of his employment he was exposed to asbestos in his work environment. The plaintiff's lawsuit alleged that she had contracted mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos on her husband's work clothes and asserted that the railroad had negligently failed to take proper precautions to protect its employees' families from "take-home" asbestos.

The railroad filed a motion to dismiss that stated that there no Illinois case set out that an employer owed a duty to its employee's family members who had been exposed to asbestos. Therefore, any ruling on the employer's duty would create a new cause of action. The railroad then went on to state that this was not an issue for the trial court, but should be decided by either the legislature or an appellate court. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case, leaving the burden on the plaintiff to appeal if she felt there was reason to create a new cause of action.

Firefighters were investigating the cause of the railroad fire and have identified the source as railroad ties catching fire on the train track between the Red Line's Chicago Avenue and Clark/Division stops. While it is currently unclear what caused the fire, Chicago Fire Department representatives have indicated that Chicago's summer heat occasionally causes the railroad ties to catch fire, but is more common on elevated trains than subway trains. Yesterday the high in Chicago was 78 degrees Fahrenheit.

Passengers aboard the Red Line subway train when the fire broke out reported black, billowing smoke that became so thick they could not see across the aisle. According to a Chicago Tribune article, by the time the train arrived at its next stop and passengers were finally able to exit, they did so in a huge rush, literally "fleeing for the exits".

The Illinois wrongful death lawsuit was filed by the mother of the driver of the vehicle and alleged that the defendants were negligent when they failed to prevent their underage guests from consuming alcohol on their property and that the defendants were in violation of the Illinois Liquor Control Act because they failed to control access to alcohol on their premises. Both decedents had attended a party at the defendants' residence hosted by their son where alcohol was being consumed.

According to the case facts, the defendants had informed their son that they would not allow any alcoholic beverages at his party and that they would be home and checking up on the teenagers to ensure there was no drinking. The defendants removed all the alcohol from the basement where the party was held and instead stocked it with soda. However, the facts further show that the defendant parents were in fact at the party when people were drinking. Witnesses further confirmed that the decedent driver was drinking at the party and was impaired when he left it.